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ADVERTISEMENT

AS

To SELL-Defendant store published two newspaper advertisements
offering for sale on successive Saturdays limited numbers of fur pieces for
one dollar, "first come, first served." The initial advertisement offered three
new fur coats "worth to $100"; the second, inter alia, one black lapin stole
"worth $139.50." Plaintiff was the first person to appear at the appropriate
counter on both days, but defendant each time refused to sell him the
OFFER
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advertised furs, asserting a "house rule" that such offers could be accepted
only by women. Plaintiff sued for contract damages. As to the offer of the
coats "worth to $100," the trial court held that the value of the coats was uncertain and disallowed plaintiff's claim. No such defect existed, however,
as to the offer of the $139.50 stole, and judgment was entered against defendant for $138.50. On defendant's appeal, held, affirmed. Since the advertisement was the only evidence of the coat's value in the ,first offer,
the trial court properly disallowed plaintiff's "speculative" claim. With
respect to the stole, however, the advertisement contained an offei, that
was clear, definite and explicit, and left nothing open for negotiation. By
being the first person to appear as requested and by tendering the price,
plaintiff accepted the second offer and was entitled to performance. Assertion of a restrictive "house rule" after acceptance was ineffective. Lefkowitz.
v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, (Minn. 1957) 86 N.W. (2d) 689.
Imposition of contractual liability based upon published advertisements
is appearing with increasing frequency, although there is said to be a
presumption that such communications are not offers but mere requests
that the reader or listener examine the advertised product and submit
an offer himself.1 In order for a newspaper advertisement to escape this
presumption, the facts must show that some performance was promised
in positive, specific terms for something requested.2 Thus where the
advertisement contains a promise to pay a reward for information, for
apprehension of criminals, or for the return of lost articles, it has often
been sustained as a valid offer of a unilateral contract.3 Some advertisements making representations as to conditions other than price have been
enforced against the advertiser,4 and in a number of cases where the
advertiser offered to buy certain described merchandise there was held

1 Salisbury v. Credit Service, 39 Del. 377, 199 A. 674 (1937); I CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§25 (1950); I WII.LisrON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §27 (1936). There would seem to be more
justification for calling a proposal in a circular an offer, since the seller retains some
control over determination of the persons to whom the circular is sent, but the authorities
are divided. That a circular is an offer, see J.E. Pinkham Lumber Co. v. C. W. Griffin
&: Co., 212 Ala. 341, 102 S. 689 (1925); Payne v. Lautz Bros., 166 N.Y.S. 844, affd. 168
N.Y.S. 369, affd. 185 App. Div. 904, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1916). But see contra, Montgomery
Ward &: Co. v. Johnson, 209 Mass. 89, 95 N.E. 290 (1911); Schenectady Stove Co. v.
Holbrook, 101 N.Y. 45, 4 N.E. 4 (1885). Cf. Hall v. Kimbark, (C.C. Mo. 1874) 11 Fed.
Cas. 234, No. 5,938.
2 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §27 (1936).
3 Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. &: Ad. 621, 110 Eng. Rep. 590 (1833); I CORBIN,
CONTRACTS §§25, 64 (1950). Prizes in contests have ,been treated similarly. 1 WII.LISTON,
CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §32 (1936).
4 Vigo Agricultural Society v. Brumfiel, 102 Ind. 146, I N.E. 382 (1885) (promise to
furnish police protection); Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140
N.E. 118 (1922) (warranties as to serviceability of used trucks); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke
Ball Co., [1893) I Q.B. 256 (guarantee to pay £100 to anyone contracting influenza after
using smoke ball).
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to be a valid offer.5 Although recovery was allowed as to the stole in
the principal case on the theory that plaintiff had accepted a valid offer
of a unilateral contract, the· weight of authority is against a •finding of
valid offers in newspaper advertisements.6 In two cases such an advertise- ment has been upheld as an offer on the ground that the stated terms
were sufficiently definite· and certain i:o be binding.7 Subjectively, · the
advertiser in these two cases and the principal case may not have intended
to be bound by a contract.8 But if the advertisement is sufficiently definite·
as to description of the merchandise, limitation of quantity,9 price, terms,
and other conditions, and if it is so framed as to -lead the reader reasonably to believe that an offer has been: made and no further negotiation
is anticipated, there should be a binding obligation. The offers in the
principal case were explicit: to sell the described article for $1.00 to the
first person accepting on a given day. Refusal by the court to uphold,
plaintiff's claim on the fur coats "worth to $100" cannot properly be
read as equivalent to a holding that no valid contract existed. The more
speculative evidence of value in the first advertisement may have been
sufficient to defeat plaintiff on the damage issue, but the terms of both
advertisements were equally specific on the points essential to formation

5 These cases have been decided on a theory that a unilateral contract is formed
with everyone who sends the requested merchandise. See R. E. Crummer &: Co. v. Nuveen,
(7th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 3; Seymour v. Armstrong &: Kassebaum, 62 Kan. 720, 64 P. 612
(1901); Schmidt v. .Marine Milk Condensing Co., 197 Ill. App. 279 (1915). See also 1
CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT §25, comment a, illus. 3 (1932).
6 In the following cases advertisements were held not to be offers: Georgian Co. v.
Bloom, 27 Ga. App. 468, 108 S.E. 813 (1921); Lovett v. Frederick Loeser &: Co., 124 Misc. 81,
207 N.Y.S. 753 (1924); Craft v. Elder &: Johnston Co., (Ohio App. 1941) 38 N.E. (2d) 416.
Cf. also People v. Gimbel Bros., 202 Misc. 229, ll5 N.Y.S. (2d) 857 (1952); Ehrlich v.
Willis Music Co., (Ohio App. 1952) ll3 N.E. (2d) 252.
7 In Oliver V: Henley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 21 S.W. (2d) 576, the seller advertised
certain cottonseed for sale c.o.d. anywhere in Texas at a price of $4.00 per sack, and the
court held that this offer was complete as to essential terms and was intended to make
quick sales without the necessity of any further communication between the parties. In
Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., (La. App. 1955) 85 S. (2d) 75, noted in 8 ALA. L. REv.
366 (1956), 31 TULANE L. REv. 652 (1957), the advertiser offered to trade a 1955 Ford when
the new models came out to anyone purchasing a 1954 Ford within a specified time. This
was held sufficiently certain and definite to be a binding offer.
8 Often persons who advertise merchandise at low prices have no intention of selling
the merchandise -to anyone at that price, but intend rather to lure customers into their
store and switch the customers' attention to higher-priced merchandise. This practice
of "bait-advertising" has been condemned ,by the Better Business Bureau, and the Federal
Trade Commission has issued cease-and-desist orders in several cases involving interstate
commerce. Local authorities have little power to stop such practices in the absence of
an "anti-bait-advertising" statute. SIMON, THE LAw FOR ADVERTISING AND MARKETING
404, 405 (1956). Holding advertisers to the tenns of their newspaper offers will combat
bait-advertising to some extent.
9 The quantity limitation is important because a seller does not have an unlimited
capacity to perform. If no limitation is stated, but other conditions are definite, one
solution might -be to imply a quantity limitation of one and require the advertiser to
sell one article at the advertised price before he can escape further contractual liability.
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of a valid contract. In cases where the advertisement was held not to be an
offer,10 the facts showed that the proposals were illusory, or were too
uncertain and indefinite as to necessary terms to create an enforceable
obligation. Absent this element of uncertainty, it would appear that the
better view would allow recovery. That courts will do so whenever
reasonably possible is indicated by the recognizable judicial attitude
deploring this type of advertising.11 Indeed, this distaste is reflected in
the principal case by the court's willingness to hold that plaintiff's second
attempted acceptance was valid, despite the fact that plaintiff knew from
his experience the previous week that he was not within the intended
class of offerees. While defendant may have asserted his "house rule" too
late to prevent plaintiff's valid acceptance of the first week's offer, it is
surprising that the court would ignore plaintiff's actual knowledge of
an essential qualification for acceptance of the second offer.12 It can only
be speculated that either this issue was not raised on appeal or, perhaps
more probably, the court's determination to bind this type of offeror
led it to an adjudication of the case based upon equities rather than
strict contract doctrine.
Theodore G. Koerner

10 Note

6 supra.
Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., note 4 supra at 338-339, the court said:
"There is entirely too much disregard of law and truth in the business, social and
political world of today. . • • It is time to hold men to their primary engagements
to tell the truth and observe the law of common honesty and fair-dealing."
12 If the offeree has subjective knowledge that an offer is not intended to apply to
him or -has been revoked as to him, he should be powerless to accept such offer. See
Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876); 1 CoNTRAcrs llEsTATEMENT §7l(c) (1932). Since
the existence of the "house rule" would tend to show that no contract was ever made,
its admission would not violate the parol evidence rule. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §577 (1950).
11 In

